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Beyond the Strike Statistics 
Ed Finn 
Bejore examining many of the mytlis surrounding the strike 
phenomenon, the author of this paper feels that the accuracy 
of the strike figures themselves should be questionned. 
Each year, when the Canada Department of Labour issues its annual 
report on work stoppages for the previous year, thèse figures are used 
as a gauge for measuring the state of the union-management relationship 
in this country. A few months ago, when the latest statistics were released, 
newspaper headlines trumpeted the news that the 7,848,360 man-days 
lost from strikes in 1972 represented a new record high. Alarmist editorials 
and indignant business spokesmen blamed it on overly permissive labour 
législation, and called for more restrictions on the right to strike. 
The concentration on time losses due to strikes — to the exclusion 
of ail other industrial relations barometers — distorts reality, fosters 
misconceptions, and diverts attention from the causes of labour-manage-
ment conflict, of which the strike is but one manifestation. 
The number of man-days of production allegedly lost because of 
strikes, when expressed in millions, always appears formidable. When 
expressed as a percentage of the number of days worked, it shrinks to 
its proper perspective. Last year's record figure works out to 43 man-
days for every 10,000 worked, or about two-fifths of 1 per cent. Time 
lost because of illness and in jury in 1972 greatly exceeded that level, 
and time lost due to unemployment rose to more than 7 per cent of total 
time worked. And yet, because of the inordinate publicity focussed on 
strikes, they are perceived to be much more of a social and économie 
problem than either unemployment or industrial accidents. The impres-
sion is conveyed that, if, strikes could 
be eliminated, ail of our économie 
troubles would vanish with them. 
FINN, E., Législative Director, 
CBRT, Ottawa. 
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Before examining this myth, the accuracy of the strike figures 
themselves should be questioned. They are based on a number of assump-
tions that are not necessarily valid. They assume, first of ail, that time 
spent in striking would otherwise hâve been spent working. This may 
not always hâve been the case. Some of the workers involved may hâve 
been laid off, become ill, or engaged in work slowdowns. Another assump-
tion is that time « lost » in strikes cannot or will not be made up after-
wards. This is obviously incorrect, since production losses in many strikes 
are soon recouped by overtime work and the use of excess productive 
capacity. 
There is also reason to doubt that ail employers are equally accurate 
in providing data on work stoppages. Situations may tempt companies to 
exaggerate or underestimate the numbers of workers taking part in a 
stoppage, and the duration of their involvement. For example, a firm 
wishing to project an image of industrial harmony may turn a blind eye 
to certain disputes, while employers eager to build a case for more 
répressive anti-strike laws may be inclined to inflate their strike figures. 
Despite thèse dubious aspects of strike statistics, they remain the 
one type of industrial relations data readily available in quantitative form, 
and as such will no doubt continue to attract excessive public attention. 
Because they also reflect the most overt form of labour-management 
conflict, they will continue to be viewed as our primary, if not only, 
industrial relations problem. In fact, it is not so much strikes that are 
the real « problem », but rather the hue and cry which they arouse. Their 
significance is grossly magnified by the press, with its thirst for the con-
troversial and the catastrophic, and its tendency to project abnormal 
behaviour as the norm. However, data chosen for its sensationalism is 
an extremely poor basis for public policy. 
It is impossible, unfortunately, to measure the loss of time and 
output through managerial inefficiency. If it were, we might find that 
managements mistakes, carelessness and incompétence cause much more 
productivity loss than do strikes. Moreover, to the extent that manage-
ment is responsible for triggering strikes, by an unreasonably intransigent 
or dictatorial attitude, it is patently unfair to blâme ail strike-induced 
production losses on workers and their unions. Unfairness, of course, it 
built into a work system that invariably labels workers as aggressors 
whenever they stop work, even when their actions are provoked by ob-
jectionable tactics on the part of management. 
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We should be cautious, too, about accepting at face value the em-
ployer' calculations of what a strike costs them in monetary terms. In 
addition to the ability of many industries to make up for time lost during 
a strike, there is the considération — often overlooked — that while a 
strike is in progress the employer is saving on such costs as wages, 
materials and components. It is not unknown that a company, faced by 
production difficulties or dwindling order books, will actually try to goad 
its employées into calling a strike, thus achieving desired savings while 
avoiding responsibility for it. 
The conclusions reached by Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross :1 in 1954 
are still valid. « It is not possible, » they declared, « to draw up an exact 
account of strike losses. To do so would require knowledge of what 
would hâve occurred in the absence of each stoppage, and the ability to 
calculate and weigh the différence — an impossible enterprise. It is 
possible only to commend the verdict that the judgment of most spe-
cialists is that the économie conséquences of strikes are overrated. > 
Insofar as lost production is concerned, a good argument could be 
made that an effective anti-flu vaccine would save far more working time 
than the most restrictive anti-strike laws. 
Strikes are so widely and strongty condemned because they are 
viewed as déviant, destructive, and irrational behaviour, and are thus 
defined as a social problem. To the workers on strike, however, it is the 
industrial system itself which is the problem, and the strike is simply 
one method they employ — admittedly the most visibly disruptive 
method — of rebelling against the system. 
In the eyes of the law, employers and employées signatory to a 
working agreement may be considered equal parties to a civil contract. 
But they are never equal parties in fact. The contract, boiled down to 
its essence, obliges workers to serve their employer, while empowering 
the employer to order them about. The relationship between them is 
inherently unequal. The workers cannot change their terms of employ-
ment without the employer's consent, whereas the employer can alter 
them simply by giving an order which the workers are expected to obey. 
It is therefore easy for the employer to talk piously about the sanctity 
of the contract, for he is seldom under any inducement to break it. 
1
 A. KORNHAUSER, R. DUBIN, and A.M. Ross, (eds) Industrial Conflict, 1954, 
New York, McGraw Hill. 
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In this kind of inéquitable system, conflict is endémie and unavoid-
able. The unequal allocation of authority is paralleled by an unequal 
distribution of wealth. What is income for the employée is a cost for 
the employer, which the latter will do his best to minimize. How the 
proceeds of industry are divided between employers and workers is thus 
determined largely by the power relationship between them, and this 
is a persistent source of conflict. Some unions hâve been able to exert 
sufficient power to extract higher wages for their members than em-
ployers would voluntarily concède; but the overall labour share of the 
gross national income hasn't fluctuated more than a few percentage 
points — between 50 and 55 per cent — in the past 60 years. The main 
change since the 19th century is simply that the absolute income of ail 
groups has risen with the increase in total national income. There are 
two reasons why conflict — and hence strikes — will continue to erupt 
over the détermination of workers' wage levels. The first is that factors 
beyond the control of unions, and sometimes of companies, are con-
tinually changing the distribution balance. Thèse include the cost of 
living, the cost of materials and other items of production, and the 
market value of output. The second and more basic reason is that there 
is no point in the rise of wage levels where workers can be expected to 
say that they are satisfied and désire no further increases. This is not 
only because of the working of Parkinson's Second Law that « expen-
diture rises to meet income », but because expectations also rise. As 
Richard Hyman2 points out, « what is important is not absolute but 
relative deprivation — the gap between the income a man receives and 
that to which he feels he can reasonably aspire. It is hardly surprising 
that workers still want more when they are daily urged by TV com-
mercials and billboards to strive for a way of life that is beyond their 
means ; and when they see that this life-style is already enjoyed by some 
sections of society (particularly by those who pontificate about 'greedy' 
trade unionists.) » 
However, although most strikes are ostensibly disputes over wages, 
we are becoming aware that many strikes are motivated as much, or 
more, by a deep dissatisfaction with the industrial system itself. Much 
has been written recently, and many studies hâve been undertaken, to 
expose the discontent of workers with the dehumanizing and stupefying 
nature of so many jobs in modem plants and offices. There is nothing 
really new in this phenomenon. Most workers hâve always worked at 
2
 HYMAN, Strikes, London, Fontana, 1972. 
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jobs that are arduous, monotonous and often dangerous, and hâve always 
resented it. It is just that, in récent years, they hâve begun to articulate 
their discontent more effectively ; they hâve been discoverecl by the 
sociologists, and so their plight has been attracting more attention. 
As collective bargaining is now structured, it cannot deal with the 
psychological causes of conflict, and it certainly is not an instrument 
that can easily be used to challenge the work ethic itself or the primacy 
of managerial control. Where employées' grievances dérive from very 
status of employées, a strike flowing out of such deprivations cannot be 
resolved unless it is reduced to monetary terms. As André Gorz 3 has 
put it, « workers insist on being paid as much as possible, not because 
they put wages above everything else, but because, trade union action 
being what it is at présent, workers can fight the employer only for the 
price of their labour, not for control of the conditions and content of 
their work. » 
This virtual exclusion of important human and spiritual concerns 
from the collective bargaining process inevitably générâtes cliscontent 
for which there exists no safety valve in the collective sensé other than 
the strike or one of its variations such as the slowdown or the « study 
session. » Individually, of course, there are numerous reactions, among 
them absenteeism, alcoholism, malingering, poor workmanship or even 
outright sabotage, and job-hopping. Thèse are ail factors that curtail 
production considerably — perhaps, taken together, to a far greater 
extent than do strikes — yet they receive relatively little attention or 
study. 
It is a serious misconception to believe that, because a worker i 
forced to treat his labour as a commodity, he also expects himself as a 
person to be treated as a commodity. Neither does it follow that he will 
be prepared to put up with anything if the wage level is high enough. 
He will find ways of expressing his dissatisfaction, either collectively or 
individually. And if légal restrictions are placed on his collective freedom 
to act, through his union, he will resort to individu al and personal 
methods of retaliation. 
Ail of which is to underline the fact that strike statistics alone are 
an imperfect measure of either industrial conflict or industrial peace. 
3 A. GORZ, « Trade Unionism On The Attack », International Sociaîist Jour-
nal, 1964. 
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They give only a partial indication of conclict, and an even less complète 
picture of the gênerai climate of industrial relations in an industry or 
in the nation as a whole. It is necessary, if we wish to get some under-
standing of this complex issue, to go beyond the strike statistics to study 
the local range of behaviour and attitudes that reflect divergent outlooks 
between owners and managers on the one hand and working people and 
their unions on the other. 
One particularly dangerous assumption that stems from exclusive 
reliance on strike figures is that, if there were no strikes, production 
would show a correspondingly large inerease. But in fact the opposite 
development could occur. Organized conflict — Le., the strike — might 
well be replaced by an upsurge of unorganized conflict as workers 
respond to oppressive situations on an individual basis. Typically, this 
means withdrawal from the source of discontent, by quitting his job, or 
by staying off work on some pretext or other. Sometimes no pretext is 
felt necessary. You may hâve heard the true story about the worker in 
a Ford auto plant who habitually failed to show up for work on Mondays. 
Asked by the foreman why he worked only four days a week, he replied : 
« Because I can't afford to work only three. » 
Other workers react individually against what they regard as the 
immédiate cause of their oppression by flouting company rules and 
discipline, and deliberately lowering both the quality and quantity of 
their production. 
Evidence from several studies suggests that in any industry in which 
workers are essentially unhappy with their work, their unrest will be 
expressed in some form. What form will dépend on a variety of factors 
— whether they are unionized, whether their union (if they hâve one) 
is traditionally aggressive, whether the gênerai unemployment level is 
high or low, whether they are skilled or non-skilled, and so on. 
In the clothing industry, for example, which employs a large number 
of unskilled young women, unrest usually manifests itself in a high rate 
of turnover rather than in strike action. In a car factory, where workers 
are organized and cohesive, they are more likely to resort to both légal 
and illégal strikes. There is good reason to believe that in many industries 
différent types of conflict function as alternatives. Strikes and absen-
teeism, for example, or strikes and high turnover, may to some extent 
be interchangeable. One study conducted in England indicated that, in 
832 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 28, No 4 
periods of économie boom, when alternative jobs are readily available, 
the incidence of strikes in certain industries tends to décline while the 
rate of job turnover rises. Conversely, when severe local unemployment 
occurs, the rate of jobturnover déclines, but strikes and absenteeism go 
up. One should not generalize on the basis of one localized study, but 
the conclusion that various expressions of industrial conflict serve as 
alternatives seems to be unquestionable. 
The expérience of the American rubber industry in the early 1960s 
is illuminating. Thèse firms, with the co-operation of the union, inciden-
tally — introduced severe disciplinary penalties against workers who took 
part in wildcat strikes. The resuit was that workers resorted instead to 
work slowdowns, with considérable success — with so much success, in 
fact, that one employer was moved to remark despairingly, « Give me 
a good clean wildcat any day ! » 
The implication of such studies and examples is that attempts to 
suppress manifestations of conflict, without removing the underlying 
causes of unrest, may merely channel the conflict into other potentially 
more destructive forms. There is a lesson hère that seems to be lost 
entirely on the proponents of anti-strike législation, which to them is 
the prescription for an industrial Utopia. It is in reality a prescription for 
industrial chaos. Even if a ban on strikes did in fact prevent them (which 
is extremely doubtful, judging from the expérience of other countries that 
hâve tried it) , it could turn Canada into the least productive strike-free 
nation in the world. 
Those who support more restrictions on the right to strike belong 
to one of three schools of thought on the subject of industrial conflict. 
They include most employers, most newspaper owners and editorial 
writers, a minority of politicians, and of course a large section of the 
gênerai public which is influenced by alarmist outeries over strikes. 
Industrial conflict, as seen by this cuit, is completely disruptive and 
destructive, a déviation from orderly, « civilized » conduct, and a threat 
to the stability of the status quo. This view assumes that the status quo 
in industry is something to be preserved, a premise that automatically 
labels strikes as a problem to be deplored and if possible eliminated. 
A second school of thought, which encompasses a growing number 
of workers and a few of the more radical politicians and académies, sees 
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the status quo itself as the problem and welcomes conflict as a necessary 
precursor of reform. Without strikes and other kinds of protest, they 
maintain that the dehumanized and undemocratic nature of modem 
industry will never be changed. 
There is, however, a third and increasingly more influential ap-
proach which views conflict as an essential ingrédient of labour-manage-
ment relations, and as a constructive outlet for frustrations and resent-
ments. Instead of threatening the status quo, strikes and other expressions 
of employée dissatisfaction, according to this view, actually reinforce 
the established industrial order. This third school of thought embraces 
most of the prominent and respected académies in the labour relations 
field, most politicians, and almost ail full-time elected union leaders. 
One of the best-known exponents of this theory is Lewis Coser4 
who argues in his book « The Functions of Social Conflict » : that industrial 
conflict, when expressed in an organized manner, through collective bar-
gaining, becomes self-regulating. Organizations of employers and workers, 
he insists, through engaging in a struggle in which neither side obtains 
final victory over the other, eventually elaborate « rules of the game » 
which both sides become anxious to protect. Despite the occasional 
disruptions and deprivations inhérent in this process, conflict thus be-
comes institutionalized, and peace can be negotiated and effectively 
maintained. 
The Fédéral Task Force on Industrial Relations, headed by Pro-
fessor H. D. Woods, put forward the same argument in its often-quoted 
statement that « collective bargaining is designed to résolve conflict 
through conflict. » 
The process of institutionalizing industrial conflict has, however, 
created serious internai strains within many unions. In particular it has 
opened up a rift between union leaders and their rank-and-file members 
— or more accurately, a séries of rifts : in communications, in philoso-
phy, in goals, in mutual trust. This widening credibility gap has manifested 
itself in factionalism, in breakaways, in the rejection by members of 
settlements negotiated by their leaders, and occasionally in the defeat 
of incumbent officers in élections. 
4 L. A. COSER, The Functions of Social Conflict, London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1956. 
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The ambivalence inhérent in the trade union function lias been 
pithily summed up by C. Wright Mills 5 in his description of the union 
leader as « a manager of discontent.. . He organizes discontent and then 
he sits on it. » He went on to warn, however, that the management of 
discontent is a dangerous process : a union which damps down workers' 
discontents too far destroys its own reason for existence. 
Unions hâve nevertheless become an essential part of the mechanism 
of social control. By providing at least partial means for resoïving the 
conflicting économie interests of management and labour, by democra-
tizing to some limited extent the work System, and by enhancing the 
rights, dignity and worth of workers, they hâve provided an important 
bulwark for the préservation of private enterprise. 
In the process the unions — or, at any rate, their top leaders — 
hâve become a part of the establishment. Their association with politi-
cians and employers on many public boards and committees and their 
accepted right to be consulted on any subject affecting their interests has 
led them to identify themselves with the established order rather than, 
as before, to see themselves as something apart from the state, as a rival 
power. Belonging, as they now do, implies loyalty ; and this loyalty is 
expressed in the exercise of restraint — both in the scale and scope of 
their demands insofar as they can control their members' aspirations, 
and in their use of officiai strike action. 
Shrewd employers hâve been quick to capitalize on the organiza-
tional needs of unions, as opposed to their agitational function. By 
granting union security concessions, for example, in return for guarantees 
of employée docility, employers can establish a basis of mutual interest 
with union leaders that may not always be in the best interests of the 
rank and file. As Mills has pointed out, employers will often agrée to 
union shop or closed shop clauses in their agreement with the union so 
as to more easily enable the union leaders to deliver a well-disciplined 
work force. 
Concern for union security tends to commit union leaders to the 
bargaining relationship with employers, and make them extremely reluc-
tant to take militant action that might jeopardize that relationship. For 
the same reason, union leaders are strongly motivated to seek and pre-
5 C. Wright MILLS , The New M en of Power, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1948. 
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serve the social legitimacy of unionism, and to accommodate their rela-
tions with both employers and governments to that end. 
Thèse pressures toward caution and conservatism, however, rarely 
extend to their grass-roots membership, who are subject to quite différent 
pressures. As workers, their main concerns are with their wages and 
working conditions, and increasingly with the subservient and unrewarding 
rôle to which they are assigned. Their dissatisfaction, when it reaches a 
certain intensity, will overwhelm their leaders' conservatism and will 
express itself in either légal or illégal strikes, or in some other equally 
disruptive if less direct form. No union leader, no matter how disposed 
he may be to peaceful accommodation, can ignore the wishes of his 
constituents with impunity. There are thus limits to which industrial 
conflict can be institutionalized and contained ; and unless union leaders, 
employers and governments take the welfare of workers into account — 
as distinct from the welfare of unions as organizations — labour strife 
will escalate rather than diminish. More workers may be driven to em-
brace the concept of the strike as a revolutionary instrument, as happened 
in Québec last year. Despite the failure of the Common Front uprising, 
the mère fact that something of this magnitude could even be attempted 
in this country should be enough to shake the complacency of those who 
feel that industrial conflict has been controlled and directed into con-
strutive channels. 
The increasing frequency and duration of strikes in Canada, while 
not the disaster painted by the anti-strike forces, is nonetheless a symp-
tom of deep-rooted malaise. There are, after ail, many factors other than 
the conservatism of union leaders which discourage Canadian workers 
from going on strike. Thèse include the légal ban on strikes during the 
term of an agreement, the social values that legitimize managerial control, 
the inhibiting effect of a hostile press and public, and the sheer force of 
habit that makes working rather than striking the norm. 
If, despite ail thèse restraints, strikes and other kinds of industrial 
conflict are multiplying, it points to inadequacies in the industrial rela-
tions system and législation, and in the collective bargaining process itself. 
It is not within the ambit of this paper to propose spécifie remédies ; that 
would require a separate présentation in itself. But in gênerai terms there 
seems to be an obvious need to expand the scope of collective bargaining 
into areas now ruled off limits as strictly managerial concerns ; to 
humanize and democratize the work-place ; to close the credibility gap 
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between union leaders and their members ; and to liberalize rather than 
restrict the right to strike. 
Thèse are ail complex and difficult undertakings, and they moreover 
entail some drastic changes on the established order, in the allocation 
of power and income in our society. So they are not likely to be attempted 
in more than a token sensé. It is much easier, and more comforting to 
adhérents of the status quo, to react to growing industrial conflict in a 
punitive fashion, and to try to reduce or eradicate it by making it both 
illégal and socially disreputable. 
To justify this simplistic approach, it is necessary to portray conflict 
— and especially strikes — as barbarie, destructive, irrational and inef-
fective. Reams of propaganda are being poured out by employers, by 
the press, and by governments, to convince the public as well as workers 
that strikes are an unmitigated evil. This propaganda seeks first, to deny 
that there is any basic conflict of interest between workers and employers ; 
second, to contend that whatever disputes arise can be settled by peaceful 
means ; and third, that the costs of a strike to the workers involved far 
outweigh the gains. 
No great effort is required to réfute thèse specious claims. The déniai 
of any conflict of interests in industry is so patently false it harldy needs 
to be taken seriously. There are in fact irréconciliable conflicts — over 
the distribution of income, over security of employment, over control and 
decision-making. 
As for the claim that, since most industrial disputes are settled 
peacefully, they ail could be, its falsity is equally obvious. As long as 
the relationship between management and labour is based on their res-
pective power, — in short, as long as the private enterprise System itself 
endures — the extent of that power will be periodically tested. As Hymen 
has remarked, « managements hâve learned to take workers' demands 
seriously only if they are willing to strike over them ; the workers know 
what is expected of them. Hence the respective perceptual frameworks 
of management and workers interact in such a way that regular stoppages 
are virtually guaranteed. » 
The allégation that the costs of strikes outweigh the gains requires 
a little more detailed rebuttal. We are ail familiar with the post-strike 
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editorials studded with mathematical examples of how much better off 
the striking workers would be if they had accepted the employer's last 
offer and stayed at work. If, say, ail that separated the final positions 
of the two sides were 2 per cent, it is argued that the wages lost in a 
two-week strike would take two years to recover, even if the union's 
full wage demand were met. The editorial writers therefore charge that 
strikes conducted under such circumstances are irrational. 
Of course they are not. There is no way of knowing, when a strike 
starts, how long it will last. If every union called a hait to a strike at 
the exact moment its possible wage gains were wiped out, companies 
would simply budget and stockpile for that length of time, and the strike 
as a union weapon would soon lose ail its effectiveness. It is fallacious, 
in any event, to look at each strike in isolation. In the on-going conflict 
between a company and a union, any one strike is simply a skirmish 
that tests and adjusts their relationship. The military analogy used by 
Allan Marshall6 is appropriate. « There is no advantage, » he declared, 
« in comparing the expense of any particular strike with the total direct 
gain in wages. . . because a strike is a mère incident in a campaign, and 
the policy of keeping up an army and entering a campaign has to be 
judged as a whole. The gain of any particular battle is not to be measured 
by the booty got in it. » 
It may seem foolish to an editorial writer that a union will balk at 
making what appears on the surface a minor concession. But the repeated 
concession of a slender margin over a period of years will in time mean 
the surrender of substantial ground. In political terms, the fact that a 
union — or, for that matter, an employer — is prepared to sacrifice in 
supporting its refusai to compromise beyond a spécifie point may exert 
a décisive influence over subséquent negotiations. A two-month strike 
over 2 cents an hour, viewed exclusively in économie terms, appears to 
make no sensé, but viewed as political behaviour it may be entirely 
logical and rational. 
As Hyman points out, « économie rationality is not the only form 
of rationality. Economists tend to assume that nothing has a value unless 
it has a market price — an exceedingly narrow conceit. If workers use 
a strike as a form of release from a work situation which they find un-
congenial and oppressive, this is perfectly rational behaviour. » 
6
 A. MARSHALL, Economies of Industry, London, Macmillan, 1899. 
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In conclusion, although there is little or nothing new in the com-
ment^ and insights provided in this paper, I hope I hâve delved beyond 
the strike statistics sufficiently to show that a strike is a social phenome-
non of enormous complexity. It is not something that can be explained 
easily, generalized about, wished away, or removed by passing a law. 
Strikes and other forms of confliet are generated by the basic structure 
of industry in our society, and will not yield appreciably to either mani-
pulation or to législation. Their outbreak will be controlled to some 
extent by the collective bargaining process, and by other inhibiting 
factors, but in the sensé that strikes are symptoms of an underlying 
malaise they will remain a central feature of industrial relations. 
The « strike problem », if it can be called that, is viewed in différent 
ways by différent groups in our society. Economists see it as a threat to 
national productivity, employers see it as a threat to their managerial 
privilège, politicians see it as a threat to the so-called public interest, 
académies see it as a fascinating subject for study and analysis. They ail 
propose solutions based on their own self-interest, or allegedly for the 
good of the nation as a whole. 
For the workers who go on strike, however, the only real solution 
to the strike problem is to transform the status of labour and the whole 
structure of control in industry. Since no such transformation is likely 
to be attempted in Canada — either by employers or governments, or 
even by the unions — strikes as an expression of workers' discontent 
will persist, despite ail efforts to prevent them. 
Au-delà des statistiques relatives aux grèves 
Chaque année, le ministère du Travail publie un rapport sur le nombre de 
jours de travail perdus à la suite des grèves. En 1972, le nombre s'établissait à 
7,848,360 jours-hommes. Hommes d'affaires et journalistes alarmistes se sont pré-
valus de ce fait pour réclamer la restriction du droit de grève. Ces propos sont de 
nature à détourner l'attention des causes véritables des conflits du travail dont la 
grève n'est qu'une des manifestations. 
En fait, le nombre de jours ainsi perdus n'équivaut qu'à deux cinquièmes de un 
pour cent des heures travaillées. Le temps perdu à cause de la maladie dépasse 
de beaucoup ce pourcentage. Quant au temps perdu par suite du chômage, on 
l'estime à plus de sept pour cent. Donc, parce qu'on met l'accent sur les grèves, 
on en vient vite à considérer qu'il s'agit là d'un problème social et économique plus 
grave que le chômage et les accidents du travail. 
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On peut également se demander ce que signifient ces statistiques dans la pra-
tique. Ne sont-elles pas fondées sur des hypothèses dont on peut mettre en doute 
la valeur ? N'arrive-t-il pas qu'un certain nombre de travailleurs touchés par la 
grève auraient pu être licenciés, auraient pu tomber malades ou se seraient trouvés 
entraînés dans un mouvement de ralentissement du travail ? Par ailleurs, il est faux 
de prétendre que le temps de la grève est toujours irrémédiablement du temps 
perdu. On le reprend ensuite. Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que certains em-
ployeurs cherchent à sous-estimer le nombre des salariés touchés par la grève, alors 
que d'autres tendent à l'amplifier. 
Ce n'est pas là l'aspect le plus important tout de même de la publication de 
ces statistiques. Parce qu'elles jettent une lumière crue sur une des facettes des 
relations du travail, elles contribuent à voiler bien d'autres éléments du problème 
considéré dans toute son ampleur. En réalité, ce ne sont pas tant les grèves qui insti-
tuent le vrai « problème », mais les huées et les clameurs qu'elles soulèvent. La 
presse, avec sa tendance à faire accepter le comportement anormal pour la règle 
générale et sa recherche du catastrophisme, contribue à en fausser la signification. 
Il est malheureusement impossible de mesurer les pertes de temps et de pro-
duction causées par l'inefficacité de la direction dont les erreurs font perdre beau-
coup plus de temps et baisser bien davantage la production que les grèves. 
Il faut aussi se défier de l'importance que certains employeurs donnent aux 
pertes financières occasionnées par les grèves dont il faut déduire ce qu'ils n'ont pas 
à débourser en salaires et en achat de matières premières. On sait que certaines 
entreprises, faisant face à un surplus de production ou à des difficultés financières 
passagères, savent comment pousser leurs salariés à la grève. En un mot, il n'est 
pas possible d'évaluer les pertes réelles résultant des grèves et, en autant qu'il 
s'agit de la production, on peut aller jusqu'à dire qu'un vaccin antigrippe efficace 
permet d'épargner plus de temps que les mesures antigrèves les plus strictes. On 
condamne la grève parce qu'on la considère comme un comportement déviant, irra-
tionnel et destructeur, alors que, en réalité, c'est le sysème indusriel lui-même qui 
fait problème, la grève n'étant qu'une des manifestations de la rébellion contre 
le système. 
En regard de la loi, on considère les employeurs et les travailleurs signataires 
d'une convention collective comme des parties égales. Mais elles ne sont pas si 
égales que cela. Le contrat, ramené à son élément essentiel, oblige le travailleur 
à servir l'employeur. Les travailleurs ne peuvent changer leurs conditions de tra-
vail sans racquîescement de l'employeur, tandis que ce dernier peut les modifier 
par voie d'autorité. Il est donc facile pour lui de se réclamer de la sainteté des 
contrats parce qu'il a rarement l'occasion de les violer. 
Voilà pourquoi sous ce système, l'état de conflit apparaît endémique et inévi-
table. Au partage inégal de l'autorité s'ajoute celui de la distribution des richesses. 
Ce qui constitue le revenu de l'employé représente un coût que l'employeur s'efforce 
de minimiser le plus possible, même s'il arrive que les syndicats les plus puissants 
réussissent à arracher des augmentations de salaires supérieures à celles que l'em-
ployeur serait prêt à concéder. Au cours des soixante dernières années, la part 
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du travail dans le revenu national brut n'a varié que de quelques points, soit de 
50 à 55 pour cent. 
Il y a deux raisons pour lesquelles les conflits, donc les grèves, continueront 
d'exister : c'est que, d'abord, des facteurs comme le coût de la vie, le coût des 
matières premières et la valeur marchande du produit, échappent au contrôle des 
syndicats et parfois aussi des employeurs ; c'est aussi qu'il n'y a pas de point de 
saturation qui puisse être atteint pour ce qui est des majorations que souhaitent 
les salariés. D'ailleurs, sur ce dernier point, la publicité commerciale se charge 
bien de le leur rappeler chaque jour. 
Cependant, même si, dans la plupart des grèves, le conflit porte ostensiblement 
sur les questions salariales, il ne fait pas de doute que beaucoup d'entre elles sont 
motivées par le sentiment d'insatisfaction qu'engendre le système lui-même. Il n'y 
a rien de nouveau dans ce phénomène. Les salariés ont toujours ressenti la dureté, 
la monotonie et, souvent le danger de leur travail. La seule différence avec le passé, 
c'est que, depuis quelques années, ils peuvent l'exprimer plus efficacement. Et le 
régime de la négociation collective tel qu'il est présentement structuré ne peut 
s'attaquer aux causes psychologiques de conflit. C'est pourquoi la grève dérive 
toujours vers des questions d'argent. Les travailleurs insistent pour être payés le 
plus possible non pas pas parce qu'ils placent la question du salaire au-dessus de 
toutes les autres, mais parce que l'action syndicale, étant ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui, 
ils ne peuvent toucher qu'au prix de leur travail et non aux conditions et au contenu 
de leur travail. 
Cette situation engendre un mécontentement contre lequel il n'existe aucune 
valve de sécurité dans le régime actuel de négociation collective si ce n'est la grève, 
le ralentisement du travail et la « journée d'étude ». Cette situation suscite aussi 
nombre de réactions individuelles comme l'absentéisme, l'alcoolisme, la paresse, le 
travail bâclé ou même du vrai sabotage. Ce sont là autant de facteurs qui contribuent 
à abaisser la productivité beaucoup plus que les grèves et, pourtant, on s'y intéresse 
assez peu. 
C'est une grave erreur que de croire que, parce que le travailleur est forcé de 
considérer son travail comme une marchandise, il s'attend aussi à ce que sa propre 
personne soit également traitée comme un objet de commerce. Aussi, trouvera-t-il 
toujours des moyens d'exprimer son mécontentement, individuellement ou collec-
tivement. Si on impose des restrictions à l'exercice de la liberté collective par l'inter-
médiaire de son syndicat, il recourra à des méthodes personnelles de représailles. 
Tout ceci permet de souligner que les statistiques relatives aux grèves ne sont 
qu'une mesure imparfaite de l'état de conflit ou de l'état de paix industrielle. Il est 
donc nécessaire de dépasser le cadre de ces statistiques pour avoir une vue juste 
de ces états. C'est une hypothèse dangereuse de penser que, s'il n'y avait pas de 
grèves, la production en serait d'autant accrue. 
L'important c'est la suppression de la cause du mécontentement, car il ressort 
nettement de toutes les études faites sur le sujet que, partout où les travailleurs 
sont malheureux dans leur travail, ils expriment de quelque façon le malaise qu'ils 
ressentent, soit en se moquant des règlements et de la discipline, soit en abaissant 
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la quantité ou la qualité de leur production. En fait, il y a une espèce d'interchan-
geabilité entre les grèves et l'absentéisme, les grèves et le roulement de la main-
d'oeuvre. Dans certaines industries, le nombre des grèves tend à décroître à me-
sure que le taux de roulement de la main-d'oeuvre augmente. Au contraire, lorsque 
le taux de chômage s'élève, le taux de roulement de la main-d'oeuvre s'abaisse, mais 
les grèves et l'absentéisme se multiplient. 
Les partisans des mesures restrictives en matière de grève s'inspirent de trois 
écoles de pensée. Pour les premiers, la grève est une déviation et une menace 
à la stabilité du statu quo existant ; d'autres estiment que c'est le statu quo lui-même 
qui fait problème et que, sans la grève ou d'autres formes de contestation, il ne 
sera jamais possible de changer la structure inhumaine et antidémocratique de l'in-
dustrie moderne ; une troisième école voit dans la grève un élément essentiel des 
relations du travail et un exutoire aux frustrations et aux ressentiments ce qui les 
incite à vouloir institutionnaliser l'instrument de la grève. 
Considérée sous ce dernier aspect, la grève ne peut que causer une espèce de 
rupture entre les dirigeants syndicaux et les travailleurs du rang, d'où la naissance 
du factionalisme, du rejet par les membres des propositions de règlement et la dé-
faite des dirigeants syndicaux à l'heure des élections. Un syndicat qui étouffe le 
mécontentement des travailleurs perd pour ainsi dire sa raison d'être. 
Il n'en reste pas moins que les syndicats sont devenus une partie essentielle 
du mécanisme de contrôle social et, à ce propos, on peut dire d'une certaine façon 
que, du fait de leur association avec les politiciens et les employeurs dans différents 
comités ou commissions, ils appartiennent à Y establishment. C'est pourquoi d'ail-
leurs les employeurs acceptent facilement les clauses de sécurité syndicale. Ces 
pressions conservatrices ne s'étendent que rarement aux travailleurs du rang dont 
l'insatisfaction s'exprime par des grèves légales ou illégales, celles-ci étant ressenties 
comme un instrument révolutionnaire. La fréquence et la durée accrues des grèves 
au Canada est le symptôme d'un malaise profond. 
Si les conflits vont toujours s'intensifiant, c'est que le régime actuel des rela-
tions professionnelles est inadéquat, et que ce n'est pas par des restrictions légis-
latives qu'on résoudra le problème. Il s'agit là d'une vue absolument simpliste. Il y 
a et il y aura toujours dans l'industrie des conflits d'intérêts irréconciliables au 
sujet du partage des revenus, de la sécurité de l'emploi et de l'exercice de l'autorité. 
Cet exposé n'avait qu'un objectif : montrer que la grève est un phénomène 
social complexe qu'on ne peut expliquer par les statistiques ni régler par l'adoption 
de mesures restrictives en matière d'exercice du droit de grève. Pour les travailleurs 
qui déclenchent une grève, la seule solution véritable se trouve dans la transfor-
mation du statut du travailleur et de la structure même des entreprises. Mais ce 
n'est pas pour demain. 
